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In the Oct. 25, 1973 issue of the New England Journal of Medicine 
Raymond Duff and A. G. M. Campbell reported on 299 deaths in the 
special-care nursery of the Yale-New Haven Hospital from January, 
1970 through June, 1972. Of this number, 43, or 14%, were the result 
of withholding treatment) The report brought public attention and 
analysis to procedures which previously had been practiced quietly, 
inconsistently, and not always with careful rationale. In the interven-
ing years, the topic of selective non treatment of defective newborns 
has been receiving increased popular and professional attention. The 
issues raised by this subject are manifold . Answers remain ambiguous, 
in part because the questions are so new and are not themselves yet 
clearly formulated. Nonetheless, three issues come forward for special 
consideration: basic assumptions concerning human life, ethical anal-
ysis and formulation, and methods of implementation of policy devel-
oped. 
Assumptions 
Confrontation with death forces concern with life and its meaning. 
Thus, in the matter of selective nontreatment of defective newborns, 
we are compelled to bring to conscious examination our basic assump-
tions about human life. The ethical analysis which follows is built on 
four premises. 
First, defective newborns are human beings. Those who, like Joseph 
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Fletcher in his statements on the topics,2 formulate their discussion 
around the "humanhood" of the neonate, obscure matters and inten-
sify visceral rather than rational response by abusing the normal sense 
of words. The neonate can be no other kind of being than human. The 
discussion is more properly set in terms of the "personhood" of this 
human life, the quality or potential quality of this human life. 3 This 
distinction is no mere semantic quibble, for while the designation of 
defective newborns as human. does not lead us directly to clear deci-
sions on appropriate treatment, acknowledgement of the humanity of 
the neonate prevents us from dismissing the infant with little reflec-
tion . Human beings merit respect. The obligation to respect requires 
that careful moral deliberation takes place. 
Secondly, human beings have value. Thus, the defective newborn is 
of value. In the discussion of the possibility of selective nontreatment, 
there is no necessary implication that such infants are of lesser or no 
value compared with other newborns. To recognize the value of the 
neonate is to assert its fundamental worth and indicate a preference 
for its protection. But once again, the recognition of value does not 
itself dictate which decisions are to be made with regard to the object 
of value. Values exist within a context of interrelated values, some-
times subordinate, sometimes superior, sometimes supplementary, 
sometimes competitive. Thus one is led to ask, valuable in relation to 
what? This points to my third premise. 
Life is valued in relation to the attainment and exercise of other 
values. Richard McCormick quotes a 1957 statement of Pope Pius XII 
regarding the moral obligation to use ordinary means of life preserva-
tion: " A more strict obligation would be too burdensome for most 
men and would render the attainment of the higher , more important 
good too difficult. Life, death, all temporal activities are in fact sub-
ordinated to spiritual ends."4 McCormick proceeds to argue-
correctly, I think - that this means that life is valuable in its relation 
to higher values, in particular to the values of human relationships and 
relation to the transcendent, through relation to neighbor. On another 
occasion, McCormick carries his analysis further. We often confuse 
two meanings of the term " life," he points out. We may mean either 
"the existence of vital and metabolic processes" or a state of or poten-
tial human personhood. The former is not valued for its own sake, but 
as a foundation for the latter.5 To argue to the contrary that the 
"basic" value of biological life must always take precedence over con-
siderations of "higher values" of personal life is to risk collapsing the 
wholistic view of man in which both physicality and spirituality are 
integral to personhood. In analysis of decisions regarding the treat-
ment or non treatment of defective newborns, therefore , life must be 
viewed within a wider constellation of personal human values. 
Fourth , just as reductionistic vitalism is questioned by an under-
standing of human being which places highest emphasis on a network 
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of personal values, so death itself is relativized by the religious per-
spective. Death, as biological cessation, is not the Ultimate Enemy. 
Because death is not the final negation, it cannot be reified into a 
demonic god who is to be avoided at all costs. This has long been 
recognized in the honoring of sacrifices for higher principles and loyal-
ties. In recent years we have seen increasing acceptance of death as a 
natural and, at times, suitable part of life. Despite some demur about 
"the indignity of death with dignity," 6 most theologians and philos-
ophers, as well as psychological therapists, have seen the contem-
porary openness to acceptance of death as a good and appropriate 
human attitude. Acceptance of one's own death as appropriate 
appears in the current literature of counseling the dying as a legitimate 
goal of personal adjustment for the terminally ill person. Acceptance 
of the appropriateness of the death of another is also proposed when, 
for such reasons as discussed below, prolongation of the life of the 
other is seen as meaningless. Thus, the death of defective newborns 
cannot, a priori, be rejected as an absolute evil. 
Paul Ramsey has argued that, viewed religiously, life is a gift and a 
trust. Thus it is immoral,he claims, to choose death as an end. One 
may allow death and choose how to live while dying, but should not 
opt directly for death.? His point should be kept in mind. It reminds 
us, as will be developed below, that western religious ethics has a bias 
toward life. Though the conclusions of this essay differ from those of 
Ramsey, acceptance of death, as described here, is neither refusal of a 
gift nor violation of a trust. It is a recognition that gifts and trusts are 
to be acted on responsibly. In the ethical analysis which follows, the 
nature of this responsibility will be outlined. 
Ethical Analysis 
Basic to the humanistic ethical analysis which is rooted in the west-
ern religious heritage is a bias toward life. While death is not neces-
sarily to be thought of fearfully, life is not to be considered lightly. 
Human life in all its personal qualities is a value to be maintained. It is 
to be given up only in carefully considered situations and for propor-
tionate reasons. Like Ramsey, Leonard Weber proposes an ethical 
viewpoint from which life is viewed as a gift. 
When life is viewed as a gift ... there are limits to what one may do to it 
and with it . To see life as a gift ... means to have an attitude of acceptance 
and protection rather than of control. 8 
This gift analogy, provided it does not lead to a hesitance to question 
or make decisions regarding experiences which come to us,9 provides a 
useful perspective. Appreciation and cultivation rather than rejection 
are responses appropriate to gifts. Thus, a bias toward life is a natural 
corollary of a world view which recognizes the world and human 
existence as, in a general sense, a gracious bestowal. 
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Two implications follow from this bias toward life. First, care 
should be taken that if we err in judgment with regard to selective 
nontreatment, we err on the side of life. We cannot avoid decisions; 
and error is an unavoidable part of human decision-making. But we 
can develop guidelines to fault, when necessary , in conservation of 
life. A second implication, one to which we shall return later, is that 
commitment to life logically should entail commitment to provision 
of means to support and enhance life. As a society we are committing 
ourselves to the preservation of lives of neonates who, under past 
circumstances, would have died. We are doing so by furnishing increas-
ingly sophisticated neonatal intensive care and other advanced forms 
of lifegiving therapy. It is reasonable to assert, however, that to give 
only existence to defective newborns, without provision for necessary 
life-long maintenance and life enhancement, is only a partial commit-
ment to life. 
Because the choice between maintaining or letting go the lives of 
defective newborns is of relatively recent origin, moralists have found 
it difficult to establish specific ethical criteria by which to guide deci-
sions. Assistance has been found, however, in a tradition which has 
been developed to deal with a closely related issue. This is the tradi-
tional distinction between ordinary and extraordinary or heroic means 
of life preservation. Widely accepted by physicians and philosopher-
theologians alike, this distinction provides guidance as to which 
actions are morally mandatory (ordinary means) and which are elec-
tive (heroic means). Although the content of these two designations is 
not without some ambiguity,10 most would use a person-centered 
rather than procedure-centered definition . According to the perSOll-
centered approach, two characteristics are central to declaring a 
proposed means heroic and therefore elective: 1) lack of benefit, and 
2) excessive personal or social burden accompanying the attainment or 
use of these means. 11 
In his Ethics at the Edges of Life, Ramsey argues that, at least in 
relation to the dying, the ordinary-extraordinary analysis can and in 
most cases should be reduced to a " medical indications" policy.12 He 
concludes that the first characteristic just cited, lack of benefit, is 
sufficient as a criterion of judgment. When treatment is no longer 
medically indicated, i.e., beneficial, it may be ceased. One may choose 
to live until death without this superfluous treatment. Even where 
death is not imminent and some might talk about a patient's right to 
.cefuse treatment, Ramsey prefers to avoid the ordinary-heroic termin-
ology in favor of a medical indications approach. He sees referring the 
decision-maker to objective elements in the context of the decision to 
be made as the prime value in not entirely jettisoning the terminology. 
Though medical indications, as Ramsey defines them, are integral to 
the analysis which follows, especially at the first level of applying the 
ordinary-extraordinary distinction, it is too narrow a base for the 
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topic as described here. This is seen even in Ramsey's presentation. He 
recognizes some right to refuse treatment by conscious persons not 
imminently dying. He acknowledges in this regard that the traditional 
ordinary-heroic distinction has been applied to those persons "whose 
lives could not be meaningfully prolonged .... "13 Further, to speak as 
Ramsey does of the possibility of refusing "life-prolonging" as con-
trasted with "life-saving" treatment when no more "curative" treat-
ment is indicated does not avoid the quality of life considerations he 
obviously wishes to tum aside. Life quality factors are surely a part of 
life-prolongation decisions, and unless "cure" means only thorough or 
substantial recovery, such considerations may be part of the definition 
here as well. Finally, it is not entirely accurate to call a medical 
indications policy solely a medical indications policy. Strictly speak-
ing, there is medical benefit to treatment which, though it cannot 
cure, can extend life even briefly. To choose, in one's way of dying, to 
refuse such treatment is to do so not because it lacks benefit, but 
because it lacks sufficient benefit. This matter of sufficient benefit 
opens the door once again to indications which are not strictly med-
ical. Ramsey's argument cautions us to define terms carefully . But the 
traditional ordinary-extraordinary categories are still useful in consid-
eration of the topic at hand and can be followed as proposed below. 
Ordinary-Heroic Distinction 
The traditional context for the application of the ordinary-heroic 
distinction differs in some ways from the problem faced by those 
considering treatment of newborns. The guidelines have been devel-
oped to assist judgment regarding persons both seriously and termin-
ally ill. They have come to be applied to those imminently approach-
ing death. Though this may be true of some defective newborns, it is 
not always so. Procedures, sometimes sophisticated, sometimes rather 
common, which reverse or significantly postpone drawing near to 
death, can often be carried out. But the question may be raised as to 
whether the procedures should be employed. Thus, the question with 
defective neonates is not can death be postponed without significant 
burden, but should it be? Can the ordinary-extraordinary distinction 
be useful as a moral guide in that question? The answer appears to be 
yes, with varying degrees of precision and certitude, at three levels. 
At one level the analysis can be applied directly in a more tradi-
tional form. Some infants may be born with such extreme physical 
defectiveness that death is imminent. Any procedures of life preserva-
tion followed would simply be a matter of prolongation of dying, 
rather than restoration to living. In such situations, treatment would 
clearly fall under the category of heroic, and therefore elective, means. 
Ramsey's identification of extraordinary with "not medically indi-
cated" would be most applicable here. The "benefit" of such treat-
ment is negligible. Selective nontreatment of newborns in that context 
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would generally be morally acceptable. 14 
The ordinary-extraordinary reasoning can be extended to a second 
level, suggested by Leonard Weber. He raises the questions: when does 
the treatment of an infant impose an excessive burden on the child? 
on the family? on society? When possible benefit to the infant can be 
obtained only by means in which the burden imposed by the treat-
ment becomes exc.essive, he argues, such means may morally be 
omitted.15 Applied to the child, this would appear to mean that when 
the treatment itself brings extended subjection to pain beyond that of 
the underlying condition, or so concentrates all energies on the sheer 
struggle to survive that personal qualities are minimized, or would 
result in severe treatment-induced disability or disease,16 such treat-
ment may not necessarily be mandated. 
This application is more difficult to use in the case of a possible 
burden imposed by the treatment on family or society. Weber himself 
recognizes this and is certain that in many instances the family could 
be, at least in part, relieved of the burden by external assistance and 
support. He also sees little likelihood of society being totally bereft of 
resources. Such considerations have led David Smith to come to an 
almost total prohibition of selective nontreatment when family or 
social burden is the prime factor of deliberation. 17 Nonetheless, given 
the lack of accessibility to sufficient assistance to all families and 
given the competition for scarce monetary and manpower resources in 
society, the application of the principle under consideration cannot be 
absolutely set aside. Severe strain and dislocation can be brought on 
families. And minimal provision of resources may not be sufficient to 
assure extensive and adequate care. This concern with the burden on 
family and society is important not so much with a view to its effect 
on them, but insofar as it reflexively creates a burden on the infant as 
well. Thus, concern with the effect of treatment can properly be 
considered in the case of the neonate, the family, and society. The 
further one proceeds from the immediate burden placed on the infant, 
however, the more caution is called for. 
The third level of application of the ordinary-extraordinary moral 
reasoning is the most problematic in current discussion. It is at this 
level that the most obvious questions of "quality of life" arise. Unlike 
the second level, at which the procedures of life preservation are ques-
tioned, it is the quality o f life itself which is at issue here. Weber, who 
avoids committing himself t o the quality of life ethic, notes the diffi-
culty of dismissing the issue. His answer, as we have seen, is to focus 
on the treatment rather than the underlying condition. Yet clearly it is 
the negative quality of life to which the treatment leads that causes 
him to admit such procedures as non-obligatory. 
Ramsey's preference for a medical mdications policy for treatment 
of the dying is in part based on his suspicion of quality of life judg-
ments. This is amplified when he distinguishes between the dying and 
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those who are perhaps incurable but not yet terminal. "Sometimes ... 
infants are not born dying. They are only born defective and in need 
of help." 18 As pointed out above, one of the implications of a life-
biased ethic is the obligation to provide such help . But one needs to 
consider the possibility that not all help will be helpful. Ramsey 
acknowledges this in the case of "non-curative" treatment of the 
dying. He also considers the possibility of the "exception" of those 
who are inaccessible to care, in states in which "care cannot be con-
veyed." 19 Perhaps to such possibilities there needs to be added 
another - the infant who, through treatment, could be kept from 
imminent death but whose life quality is so minimal that it renders 
"help" not helpful and therefore extraordinary . 
The argument of Richard McCormick is helpful. 20 He proposes a 
line of thought which sees quality of life judgments as an appropriate 
implication of traditional ordinary-heroic moral analysis. Examining 
past applications of this tradition, he finds that the type of life a 
person would have to live was often determinative of whether certain 
actions were morally obligatory or not. He argues further that the 
moral tradition within which the ordinary-extraordinary analysis is set 
assumes that biological life "is a value to be preserved precisely as a 
condition for other values, and therefore insofar as these other values 
remain attainable." 21 It is the quality of life which finally renders 
means ordinary or heroic. Discussion of selective nontreatment must 
therefore take this issue under serious review. 
Quality of Life Considerations 
Recognizing the need for quality of life considerations is far easier, 
however, than actually providing specific content to that formal criter-
ion. Attempts at definition have varied. Joseph Fletcher's 15 positive 
human criteria build out from neo-cortical functioning to include such 
variables as minimal intelligence, a sense of time, concern for others, 
curiosity, and idiosyncrasy.22 James Nelson points to socialness, 
capacity to experience limitation and freedom, and religiosity or 
intentionality.23 Michael Tooley focuses on self-consciousness. 24 The 
debate among these moralists and others indicates the need to proceed 
with caution in this matter. 
The line of reasoning proposed by McCormick provides such a 
cautious but useful starting point. As seen earlier, McCormick places 
special emphasis on relational potential. Life is a good insofar as it 
affords access to higher goods, in particular to the goods of social 
relatedness and relationship to the transcendent through relationship 
to neighbor. Thus, this relational potential would be the touchstone of 
quality of· life judgments. McCormick argues, "It is neither inhuman 
nor unchristian to say that there comes a point where an individual's 
condition itself represents the negation of any truly human - i.e., 
relational - potential. When that point is reached, is not the best 
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treatment no treatment?" He answers his own question: "When in 
human judgment this potential is totally absent or would be, because 
of the condition of the individual, totally subordinated to the mere 
effort for survival, that life can be said to have achieved its potential." 25 
Absence of minimal relational potential could probably be ascribed 
to the anencephalic neonate. Such infants currently cannot ultimately 
be kept from dying. Should technical means beyond those now avail-
able be developed which would sustain their lives, indefinitely or for 
an extended period of time, these newborns would be rather clear 
cases of appropriate candidates for nontreatment. On the other hand, 
as Gustafson argues,26 it is the capacity for relationship that is one of 
the strong reasons for the life preservation of Down's Syndrome in-
fants. The judgment for other infants is not so clear. Early diagnosis 
and, even more so, prognosis 27 are difficult. Moralists can point to the 
criteria. Medical and psychological science will have to help fill out 
these criteria with specificity. Individual decisions will be, made with 
risk, but cannot be avoided. Caution and courage are called for. 
It may be more difficult yet to determine when the condition of 
the individual subordinates all else to "the mere effort for survival" 
and thereby minimizes the capacity for relationship. Constant severe 
pain , incapacitating response to treatment, or enduring non-conscious-
ness may be elements of such a condition. Some moralists have drawn 
upon the established maxim of medical ethics primum non nocere 
(first do no harm) in this context. H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr., for 
example, proposes the concept of "the injury of continued existence" 
to apply where conditions of continuing life would not be tolerable. 28 
In the same fashion, participants in a conference sponsored by the 
University of California, San Francisco, included as one ethical prop-
osition of their moral policy, 
Life·preserving intervention should be understood as doing harm to an 
infant who cannot survive infancy, or will live in intractable pain, or cannot 
participate even minimally in human experience. 29 
The interaction of human potential and the level of care and sup-
port provided are demonstrated in prognosis of the infant's future 
relational ability within the context of subordinating all else to the 
effort for survival. Relational potential may be kept at a low level if 
initial and life-long support is not adequate. This fact in turn directs us 
toward a closer look at the inference drawn earlier from the ideal of 
"bias toward life." Commitment to life logically entails commitment to 
provision of means to support and enhance life. Our assessment of 
quality of life potential is based in part on our expectation of benefits 
from treatment we are willing or able to provide. John A. Robertson 
points out that the low quality of life expectation of some defective 
newborns is due to the absence of provision made by society to bring 
these children to their fullest capability. This lack of provision, which 
is "the fault of social attitudes and the failings of healthy persons," 
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rather than congenital defectiveness in the infants alone, is often a 
subtle factor in the judgment that the neonate has little potential. 30 
Two implications can be drawn from these observations. First, in 
following out the bias toward life, we must be assured that those 
whom we keep alive are given full opportunity to maximize their 
potential. Continuing research and development in neonatal, pediatric, 
and adult medical care of persons with defects should be sup-
plemented with provision of extensive social support services. If chil-
dren are now kept alive who would previously have died , we are 
obliged to help them achieve their highest quality of life . Families who 
care for these children need the assistance of such services as special 
education, physical therapies, and family counseling. Financial relief 
and respite care may be necessary. Institutions for raising such chil-
dren need to be fully funded and staffed so as to be compassionate 
rather than custodial care. It is not fair to the newborn to choose a life 
he would not otherwise have to suffer and not choose to allocate the 
resources to' make that life livable. 31 
Thus, a second implication which could be suggested is that some 
possible criticism of selective nontreatment is unjustified unless we 
provide the personal life enhancement to follow the biological life 
preservation. The more we provide for life support and enhancement, 
the less appropriate will selective nontreatment be. The converse may 
also be true. The less often means of increasing life quality are made 
available, the more choices not to maintain life may be justified. While 
ethical and/or medical decisions ought not simply reflect current 
structures of social justice, neither ought they be made without any 
reference to them. Recognizing that financial and personnel resources 
are not inexhaustible, allocation decisions will have to be made and 
consequences faced honestly. 
We have seen, then, that life-biased ethics will incline us toward 
caution in judgment about selective nontreatment and that it urges us 
to expand life-enhancing services, thus increasing the number of 
neonates for whom a life preservation decision is appropriate. Recog-
nizing that avoidance of death is not always the most suitable stance, 
we have found help in decision-making in the tradition of the ordi-
nary-extraordinary means analysis. This has led us to see that selectiv~ 
nontreatment may be a moral decision when dying is irreversibly prox-
imate, when the means of life maintenance themselves create excessive 
burden, and when relational potential is negligible or unable to be 
exercised. 
Implementation 
Although a complete analysis is beyond the scope of this essay, 
directions of thought regarding implementation of the foregoing moral 
analysis are offered. Issues are complex here, especially in light of ex-
cesses which are to be avoided. Two major concerns come to mind: who 
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is to make the decision? What legal status should such decisions have? 
There is little moral or legal question over the necessity or propriety 
of proxy consent in the treatment of defective newborns . . Paul Ram-
sey has recently focused attention, however, on the parameters of the 
acceptable range of decisions to be made as he questions the criteria 
used in the deliberation process. He states that both covenant loyalty 
to others and familial, medical, and legal obligations "require that a 
medical indications policy alone be applied where another, voiceless, 
human life is at stake." 32 To do otherwise, he argues , is to open the 
door to quality of life judgments, to risk circularity of r'easoning in the 
"reasonable man" approach to proxy consent, and to chance ascribing 
rather than discovering the best interest of the patient. Although the 
caution which prompts Ramsey's concern must not be set aside, we 
have already seen that criteria other than medical indications might 
morally be applied. Thus, we must cautiously enter the domain of 
substituted judgment. 
There are at least four possible loci of decision-making : the parents, 
the physician, a review committee, and the courts. Each has its bene-
fits and drawbacks. Each does, in fact, have a role to play , but the 
preponderance of opinion among moralists has given priority to par-
ents. Parents, of course, do not own their children. They are not free 
morally or legally to do whatever they wish with their children. Weber 
correctly observes that "it is better to speak of the obligations rather 
than the rights of parents." Where obligation lies, there lies also a 
degree of priority in decision-making. "They have the obligation to 
care for their children and the obligation to make decisions that ser-
iously affect the future of their children." 33 The relationship of deci-
sion and nurturing can also be noted here . Engelhardt points out that 
"the decisions in these matters correctly lie in the hands of the par-
ents, because it is primarily in terms of family that children exist and 
develop .... " 34 Both the general obligation of parents to children and 
their specific role in nurturing direct us to the parents as having 
primary claim on the role of decision-maker. 
Although at an earlier point in the development of neonatal med-
icine, the press of very limited time often forced physicians into the 
decision-making role, modern procedures make this decreasingly true. 
This being so, Daniel Maguire argues that the doctor may be an 
inappropriate person to be given a primary role in decisions due to 
such factors as traditional professional roles, the trend toward mixing 
experimentation and care, lack of specific ethical training, and fear of 
legal complications. 35 The physician does, however, have medical 
information necessary to make an informed decision. Facts about the 
infant's current status and probabilities regarding future developments 
must be shared with the parents. Thus, the first role of the doctor in 
this process is as a source of information. 36 
A hospital review committee, made up of institutional personnel, 
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possibly including community representatives, has the disadvantages 
of emotional abstraction and the compromise nature of decision-by-
committee. Such a committee, nevertheless, might playa useful role in 
establishing general hospital guidelines within which parents and 
physicians could work. Similarly, the courts represent the wider inter-
ests of society. Not always equipped to be the first voice of decision, 
the courts playa role in appeal of decisions at a lower level. However, 
if other courts follow the recent decision of the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court in the case of Joseph Saikewicz,37 Lhey will 
playa more central role than proposed here. Some ambiguity remains 
about the exact implications of the Saikewicz decision , but it did 
intent! to claim to the court's jurisdiction primary decision-making 
prerogative in at least certain nontreatment contexts. Although it now 
appears to include fewer cases than first feared by many physicians 
and ethicists,38 this ruling will result in more decisions in the courts. 
The more this is restricted to conflict of judgment situations men-
tioned below, the less will the court involve itself in actions outside its 
special competence. 
Thus we return to the parents as primary locus of decision. Some 
argue that the emotional involvement of parents makes them unfit for 
decision. Deliberation would be swayed by rejection of the infant, 
growing out of shock or disappointment,39 or by need to compensate 
due to feelings of guilt. Studies are mixed on this matter. While some 
show the danger does exist, others have shown it can be less of a 
problem than anticipated. Raymond Duff has observed that "if fam-
ilies regardless of background are heard sympathetically and at length 
and are given information and answers to their questions in words 
they understand, the pro blems of their children as well as the 
expected benefits and limits of any proposed care can be understood 
clearly in practically all instances." 40 Duff found the parental deci-
sions to have been thoughtful and reasonable. Rosalyn Darling also 
found data suggesting that parents can be responsible in their judg-
ments. Her study showed that though many parents admitted dis-
appointment, the typical attitude came to be "realistic acceptance." 
In fact, she found physicians to define the situation as a tragedy more 
often than parents.41 Considering this possibility for careful and 
thoughtful decision-making by parents and noting that parental reac-
tion may be corollated with the nature of the defect and options of 
community support perceived to be available,42 we recall the point 
made earlier. If we as a society wish to establish a bias toward life, we 
must also make commitments to provision of support and enrichment 
resources. 
Priority in the decision-making process and the generally respon-
sible action of parents would not, of course, guarantee that choices 
will always be correct. Here is the second point at which physicians 
and society, through review committees or the courts, may play an 
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important role. We have seen their role in provlSlon of information 
and guidelines. Here the issue is intervention. When the parents' deci-
sion can reasonably be construed as acceptable, no steps should be 
taken to counter that choice. Three points of intervention may be 
appropriate, however: one opposing nontreatment, two pursuing it. 
Engelhardt argues that "society has a right to intervene and protect 
children for whom parents refuse care ... when such care does not 
constitute a severe burden and when it is likely that the child can be 
brought to good quality of life." 43 Engelhardt views such intervention 
as necessary both for the sake of the specific child and with the social 
impact in mind that selective non treatment in such cases could have in 
undermining respect and care for children in a more general sense. The 
link between intervention and responsibility for nurturing should be 
called to mind. To overrule the parents' decision may require us to 
provide them with counseling and community support to help them 
fulfill the role we are asking of them. Or we must make available 
adequate institutional care for children whose parents cannot or will 
not raise them. To intervene without such provision is unfair both to 
parents and children. 
To intervene in favor of nontreatment may be more difficult to 
justify, given the recognition of parental obligation to protect and care 
for their children and covenantal moral and legal obligations to con-
tinue care once it is begun. Two possibilities for such intervention 
have been suggested and should at least be mentioned. Engelhardt 
proposes that a challenge to the decision to continue treatment might 
be appropriate where extended life for the infant would lead to endur-
ing pain, etc., which has been lightly considered by the par-
ents. 44 This circumstance would seem rare. Also possible is the situa-
tion brought about by the problem of allocation of scarce resources. 
One of the propositions put forward by the Sonoma Conference states: 
In cases of limited availability of neonatal intensive care, it is ethical to 
terminate therapy for an infant with poor prognosis in order to provide care 
for an infant with a much better prognosis. 45 
Such a stance is not above moral challenge.46 We have noted above 
the general acceptance of the principles of parental obligation to care 
and the covenantal obligation of care which has begun. Applied to the 
situation under consideration, this would seem to mean that interven-
tion in favor of · non treatment in such cases will probably also be 
infrequent. While intervention in favor of nontreatment cannot be 
excluded out of hand, challenge against nontreatment is more easily 
justified and would no doubt be the more common. 
A thorough and clear legal review of selective nontreatment of 
defective newborns has been provided by John Robertson 47 and will 
not be treated extensively here. A few remarks will suffice. Direct, 
active taking of the life of the newborn (not under consideration in 
this essay) is clearly defined legally as murder. But participants in 
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selective nontreatment, family or medical personnel, could also be 
held criminally liable, for charges ranging from homicide to neglect to 
violation of child abuse laws. Although prosecution has been rare and 
conviction even more so, there is no assurance that it will always be 
so. The spotlight thrown by more public discussion of this issue may 
encourage legal action. With increased legal action or without it, the 
threat of prosecution may inhibit parents and medical personnel in 
their decision-making. These deliberations are difficult to carry out 
apart from legal considerations which affect them. If we accept as 
moral the decision for selective nontreatment, we must allow those 
who make the decisions to do so without excessive fear of the law. 
Carte blanche in decision-making is neither legally nor morally 
acceptable. Drafting of clear and useful legislation has not moved far 
with regard to other contexts of decisions to allow death. There is no 
reason to believe it will prove easier with regard to newborns. Some 
argue that any legislation would prove restrictive to decisions cur-
rently made quietly in the absence of specific law. This overlooks the 
possible persecution under existing law and the effect on decision-
making of fear of this possible legal action, but it does caution us to 
proceed carefully in this matter. Two suggestions are in order. First, 
laws which permit rather than mandate decisions are preferable. This 
would maintain respect for a bias toward life, avoid the spectre of 
assigning certain infants to death, and still allow for decisions that 
should be made. Second, legislation and the courts can look after the 
processes by which decisions are made to assure that full deliberation 
has taken place.48 To involve the courts in all initial deliberations 
would be cumbersome, time-consuming, and counterproductive to the 
process being pursued. Development of fair yet cautious laws will not 
be necessary. But as Duff and Campbell urged in their 1973 article, "If 
working out these dilemmas ... is a violation of the law, we believe 
the law should be changed." 49 
Conclusion 
Each year parents, physicians, and courts are facing questions of 
treatment or nontreatment of defective newborns. Developing ethical 
reflection, changing medical possibilities, and increasing court rulings 
render the decision-making process, already painful and difficult for 
those involved, even more complicated. Against the background of 
personal anguish and perplexing deliberation for those who must come 
to the point of decision, continued effort must go into ethical analysis 
and policy formulation. 
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